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There has been a perennial return in the history of thought to the dia-
lectic of the one and the many, and so the foundations of mathematics 
as developed through time could not but reflect this same dilemma. 
This article, as its point of departure, looks at the meaning of “one” in a 
few authors of Ancient and Scholastic thought. Then the author turns 
to the unique event of the Pact of unity between Chiara Lubich and 
Igino Giordani. She goes on from there to examine the abstract pattern 
of “oneness” which emerges, utilizing some of the categories offered by 
modern mathematics, from set theory to mereology. The One resulting 
from the Pact turns out to be a concept that has a rational underpin-
ning, since the conceptual instruments for its formal description can 
be found in the foundations of mathematics. On the other hand, the 
author argues that familiarity with the structure of the One resulting 
from the Pact can be a significant factor in the development of a prom-
ising new axiomatic framework. 
Introduction The pact of unity between Chiara Lubich and Igino Giordani marked the start of a luminous period in the history of the 
Work of Mary. It was a unique event, rich in theological and an-
thropological contents, with some very interesting repercussions 
also in humanistic disciplines, from psychology to sociology.1 
However, mathematics, by its very nature, requires putting aside 
any personal or contingent considerations. Its object is pure form, 
an abstract pattern of relationship. It considers and examines the 
formal properties of a system, apart from any particular content. 
Thus with respect to the “event of the Pact,” which other disci-
plines can treat more directly, mathematics can offer only a sort 
of phenomenology reduced to bare bones, approaching perhaps 
what Husserl meant by the term “formal ontology.” Thus our at-
tempt will be to discern whether there are conceptual instruments 
in mathematics suitable for grasping and describing the qualita-
tive leap which emerges in the event/Pact, capable of distinguish-
ing the difference between the pattern of unity, i.e. the “oneness,” 
1. Cf. the new book of the Abbà School: Maria C. Atzori, Vera Araujo, and Hubertus 
Blaumeiser, eds., Il Patto del ’49 nell ’esperienza di Chiara Lubich: Percorsi interdisciplinari 
(Rome: Città Nuova, 2012). The present article was developed in a joint project with 
the authors of this book, where the original texts of Chiara Lubich regarding the Pact 
of ’49 can be found in a complete form, as well as studies from the point of view of 
various disciplines. Hereafter referred to as P. 
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manifested before the Pact and after. We shall not attempt to an-
swer the question “Why?”2
To avoid any misunderstanding it will be well from the start 
to stress that the “Oneness” which is the main object of our study, 
i.e., the “One” which is the result of the Pact, does not refer to the 
“number one” which precedes two and three, the “generator” so to 
say of the sequence of “natural numbers.”3 Rather the term One 
here refers to a specific pattern of relationality, which although not 
a number is a legitimate object of mathematical study in the sense 
explained above, in that it represents an abstract pattern. 
Our thoughts will be grouped into three areas. In the first, 
we will present brief quotations of three authors of Ancient and 
Scholastic thought who although not mathematicians, provide 
useful insights for our subsequent analysis of the concept “one.” In 
the second part, we will highlight some elements from the texts of 
Chiara Lubich that are relevant to our topic. In the third, we will 
present some categories and instruments offered by contemporary 
mathematics, in an attempt to discern whether they can be useful 
for our purpose. 
Of course, any adequate passage back and forth from the lan-
guage of mystical experience to that of mathematics would require 
a level of epistemological reflection and detailed mediation which 
are beyond the scope of this article.4 We will remain on a basically 
2. For a theological commentary, see: StefanTobler, “Il significato del patto per il pen-
sare teologicoe,” in P, pp. 139–151; and Brendan Leahy, “Il Patto e la chiesa: Considera-
zione ecclesiologiche in chiave storia,” in P, pp. 59–80.
3. “One” is the “generator” of the number system for Pythagoras as well as, in modern 
times, for Giuseppe Peano, in whose system Arithmetices Principia the central axiom 
is “1 is a number.” 
4. For a more rigorous approach with the proposal of a specific formal language as an 
instrument of mediation, see: Judith Povilus and Lidia Obojska, “Ontologie formali 
intuitive level, utilizing a few metaphors which can be found both 
in mystical experience and in mathematics. With no pretext of 
providing an exhaustive account, we hope to offer a glimpse that 
could open possible vistas for further deepening and new paths for 
research. 
1. The Meaning of “one” in Ancient and Scholastic Thought
From ancient times, the concept of “oneness,” as related to math-
ematical properties, has also been considered from the viewpoint 
of philosophy and theology. Atom or not atom? Points or a con-
tinuum? The philosophers of ancient Greece debated on these 
topics, under various guises, from Democretean atomism to Par-
menedian monism. Basically the same question lies at the heart of 
the distinction between arithmetic (the science of numbers) and 
geometry (the science of measure). Are they two parallel paths or 
can one be built up from the other? If so which comes first? Even 
before mathematical philosophy came into being as an academic 
discipline, we can find reflections centered on these questions dot-
ting the philosophical/theological thought which underlies West-
ern culture. I shall mention a few of these by way of introduction 
to our theme.
1.1 “oneness” and the One in Plato
From a text of Aristotle, we know that those who went to listen to 
Plato’s talks were astonished to find that he would begin by talking 
about “mathematical objects, numbers, geometry and astronomy,” 
and end up speaking about the ultimate supreme Good which is 
e paradigma trinitario: Alla ricerca di un linguaggio base per esprimere uno specifico 
pattern di relazionalità dinamica,” Sophia 2 (2012): 177–195. 
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the One.5 One could ask what is the meaning of this ultimate One 
to which he refers. Certainly it is not intended merely in the nu-
merical sense, since he already included that in the premises con-
cerning “mathematical objects.” The meaning of this “One” is of a 
more metaphysical nature. We could imagine it emerging from his 
personal experience, perhaps a mystical experience of the Master, 
since he refers to this “One” as the greatest Good and happiness. 
In the Phaedo, reflecting on the cause of the distinction between 
one and two, between one and many, Plato states that which would 
be one has to participate in “Unity,” in the Idea of the One, just as 
that which would be two has to participate in “Duality.”6 
This expression used by Plato gives us to understand that the 
one and the two that are at the basis of the science of numbers 
derive from a primitive reality which precedes every subsequent 
conceptual distinction of a scientific nature. One and many (the 
One and Duality) are two co-essential concepts each of which has 
meaning only in relation to the other, as illustrated in the complex 
context of Plato’s “Unwritten Doctrines.”7
In modern times, along the same line of Plato’s thought men-
tioned above, we find the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer, 
founder of the mathematical school called “intuitionism,” states 
that all mathematics develops out of a single fundamental a priori 
intuition: “pure two-oneness.” In his words, this basic intuition 
“is at the origin not only of the numbers one and two, but also 
of all the finite ordinal numbers, since one of the elements of the 
5. Aristotle, Harm. Elem., II, 39–40; We can note that Aristotle often quotes Plato’s 
“On the Good,” which probably contains the heart of his teaching.
6. Plato, Phaedo, 100a–101d.
7. For further analysis, see: Heinrich J. Rickert, L’uno, l ’unità e il numero uno: Osser-
vazioni sulla logica del concetto di numero (Milan: Ed. Cusl, 2008), pp. 52–62.
two-oneness can again be thought of as a two-oneness, and this 
same process can be repeated indefinitely.”8 We can note, how-
ever, that in beginning from the pattern “two-oneness” (without 
any consideration of dynamic relationality) Brouwer remains in 
a mathematics of the discrete. For this reason he does not accept 
in his mathematical system anything beyond the natural numbers 
and refuses any reasoning based on the continuum. 
1.2 Reference to “one” and “One” in Thomas Aquinas  
and Bonaventure
With the revelation of God’s nature as being One and Triune, and 
with the subsequent doctrinal development engrafted on Greek 
metaphysical categories, a further distinction is made between 
“one” considered as a number, generator of all the numbers, and 
One as the supreme Good. 
Thomas Aquinas, for example, stressed that the oneness of God 
is not a mathematical oneness, just as the “number” of the divine 
Persons of the Trinity is not a number in the mathematical sense. 
For this reason, he says, Pythagoras and Plato were in error, not 
distinguishing between: “ ‘One’ which is convertible with being” 
and “ ‘one,’ which is the principle of number.”9 “ ‘One’ which is con-
vertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend 
on matter in its being.”10 
Bonaventure, on the other hand, is more in the line of Plato 
and Augustine. Meditating on the distinction between “one” and 
“One” he reaches the conclusion: 
8. Quoted in Edwardo Boncinelli and Umberto Bottazzini, La serva padrona: Fascino 
e potere della matematica (Milan: Raffaello Cortina, 2000), p. 76.
9. Summa Teologica, I, Q. 11, A. 1, rep. 1. 
10. Ibid., I, Q. 11, A. 3, rep. 2, 39.
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If anywhere it be said that a number of ideas can be found in 
God, this goes far from the proper sense of number, as in the 
case of the number of the divine Persons, which is not com-
prised of multiple discrete units, but rather by the repetition 
of one and the same unit in the diverse hypostasi.11 
This passage would appear to describe quite well one of the char-
acteristic elements of the pattern of the Pact which is the object of 
our study (see point 2.3 below). However it needs to be integrated 
with another profound intuition of Aquinas: “The supreme unity 
and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute 
things, but not plurality of relations.”12 We will return to this im-
portant affirmation later (see point 2.2 below).
2. The “One” which is a Result of the Pact as Described in the 
Notes of Chiara Lubich
The “One” that is a result of the Pact of unity of 1949, as we said 
before, represents a qualitative leap beyond the life of unity experi-
enced by Chiara Lubich and the group around her in the years pre-
ceding that event. The Pact introduces them into a new dimension 
in which the “One,” that does not preclude multiplicity, (logically) 
precedes the various individuals, the distinct “onenesses,” rather 
than resulting from them. As it were, the “normal” way of consid-
ering things is turned upside down, beginning from the “One” and 
moving toward the many included in the “One.” Although other 
studies have already considered some of the characteristics of the 
new condition of “Oneness” to which we refer,13 it will be useful 
11. De Sc. Chr., III, ad. ob. 8. 
12. Summa Teologica, I, Q. 30, A. 1, rep. 3.
13. Cf. P. 
to mention some of these briefly in view of the formal analysis we 
wish to make of the abstract pattern that appears.
2.1 From Many Rays to a Single Point
The metaphor of the “point” sheds light on the difference between 
“before” and “after” the Pact. Before the Pact “a multiplicity of rays 
of the sun” of God’s will could be distinguished, “varied for each 
individual and yet one as the substance of the sun is one” (38–40).14 
Afterwards there is a new situation, metaphorically described as 
being “in the point where two rays [that of Chiara and that of 
Igino Giordani] converge.” “It is the point where creation van-
ishes in that which is Uncreated, where nothingness is lost in the 
Bosom of the Father. . . .” (42). Some recent studies on the formal 
ontology of boundaries highlight profound issues connected with 
this concept.15 They make it clear that every qualitative distinction 
demands a boundary or border, that in the mathematical language 
of the metaphor used by Lubich corresponds to a point. It is the 
point of conjunction which marks the distinction between before 
and after, between within and without. Chiara describes this point 
as being the border between heaven and earth, between creation 
and that which is Uncreated. It is the same image she uses to de-
scribe Jesus forsaken: “[T]hat Nothingness in which the rays of 
the Sun flow together.” In making the Pact of unity, Chiara and 
Igino relinquish, as it were, any specific personal trait in order to 
live the mystery of Jesus forsaken and let the Eucharist, Christ in 
14. The numbering here and hereafter refer to the text of Chiara Lubich as found in P. 
15. Cf. Berry Smith and Achille C. Varzi, “The Formal Ontology of Boundaries,” Elec-
tronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1997); Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi, Parts 
and Places: The Structure of Spatial Representations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 
71–97.
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the Eucharist, be the bond which joins them. In so doing, they find 
themselves in the common focal point ( Jesus forsaken = Christ) 
that binds two qualitatively diverse realities in one. In another 
passage she writes: “[W]hat remains when two or more souls are 
combined? Jesus—‘the One.’ ”16 Thus, they “find themselves” there 
on the border, no longer outside on distinct rays approaching ever 
closer and closer to the Sun, but “One,” in a single point that is 
both “within and without.” 
2.2 A “one that is more one”
The “One” which results from the Pact is not static and monolithic, 
but rather includes a dynamic wealth of relations. It is precisely for 
this reason that the quality of “being one” can constantly increase, 
quite differently from what is normally said of an individual entity. 
Lubich compares Jesus forsaken to a divine Atom which splits: 
“the One which is divided,” but at the same time to a nothing/all 
in which, underlying the many, one can discover the Trinity, “an 
open door to the Trinity.”17 
It is precisely in the light of this “One” that is non-monolithic, 
but substantiated with relation (cf. Thomas Aquinas above) that 
it becomes possible to speak of a “one that is more one.”18 This is 
16. Quoted in Judith Povilus, Gesù in mezzo nel pensiero di Chiara Lubich (Rome: Città 
Nuova, 1981), p. 67. The term “combine” evokes the metaphor from chemistry also used 
in the preceding sentence: “we are not called to form a ‘mixture,’ but a ‘combination.’ ” 
The date of this quote (12/2/1946) reveals how the concept of One, experienced in the 
Pact, was already alive in the mind of Lubich in the years before. 
17. Lubich, cit. in Lidia. Obojska and Judith Povilus, “From the Total Gift of Self to a 
New Relationaly View of Reality: From a Mystical Insight to the Foundations of 
Mathematics: A Transdisciplinary Approach,” Metanexus, electronic edition, 2009. 
18. Not in the sense of a sum (1 + 1); in the original Italian there could be confusion 
on this, but in a qualitative sense of an entity (“one”) becoming “more one” in itself.
true because one relation does not exclude the others, but rather 
opens toward them. The dynamic reality of a “one that is more 
one” grows beyond measure and is ever more strengthened from 
within, thanks to this multiplicity of interrelations. Welcoming 
our brother or sister within ourselves, into our personal “Heaven,” 
we enter the dynamic process of “going from one Heaven up to the 
next,” and experience “a one that is more one, a new simplicity, a 
new purity, a new love.”19 
2.3 The Whole in Every Part
The new reality of “Oneness” experienced through the Pact pres-
ents a pattern, a configuration, in which the whole is present in 
every part.20 “The One coincides with many” as in the Mystical 
Body where “each member is Christ and all together are Christ.”21 
If we further analyze this pattern in its dynamic richness, we see 
19. “In Paradise, the further in one goes, the more Unity and Distinction are accentu-
ated. Today we are all Jesus, therefore much more one than yesterday,” C. Lubich quoted 
in Umberto Blaumeiser, “All’infinito verso la disunità: Considerazioni sull’inferno alla 
luce del pensiero di Chiara Lubich,” Nuova Umanità 19 (1997): 567. 
20. Some holistic effects observable in the physical universe, for example the holo-
gram, or the various applications of fractal geometry, evoke, although in an incom-
plete way, this pattern of “the whole in every part.” John Polkinghorne evidences the 
inherent relationality of the universe which is emerging from some recent discoveries 
of modern physics and comments: “The language of science and the language of the-
ology are not connected by bonds of logical necessity, but by an alogical relation of 
consonance, a degree of conceptual congruity that makes it mutually illuminating to 
consider together science’s picture of the relational nature of the physical world and 
the theological belief in the Trinitarian nature of God.” The Trinity and an Entangled 
World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghorne (Cam-
bridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), p. 12. 
21. Chiara Lubich, in Judith Povilus, “Il ‘mistero’ del continuum nella matematica e al 
di là dei suoi confini,” Nuova Umanità 22 (2000): 621. “When [ Jesus] is among us 
we are ONE and we are THREE, each of which equal to the one.” C. Lubich, “Vita 
Trinitaria,” Nuova Umanità 24 (2002): 136.
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that every reality is in every other, and at the same time each con-
tains all the others in itself. 
2.4 Being Fused into One
Lastly, we can note Lubich’s repeated use of expressions such as 
being “fused together in one” in conjunction with the metaphor of 
fire, and being “consumed into one,” (cf. Jn 17: 22–23) to describe 
the event of the Pact. Love “is a fire that co-penetrates hearts in a 
perfect fusion”;22 “in the fire of the Trinity we were . . . fused into 
one” (36). “And we were no longer the two of us, but He in us. He 
was the divine fire that consumed our two very different souls into 
a third: his own, all Fire. And so we were One and Three.”23 In 
what follows we will see that the technical term “fusion,” used in 
mereology to define a certain kind of union of parts, does not suf-
fice to express what is signified in this case.
3. Interpretations of “one” in the Light of Modern 
Mathematics 
Setting aside considerations of a geometric and algebraic nature in 
order to go back to the epistemological foundations of the science 
of numbers, we can sum up the principal interpretations of “one” 
in modern mathematics as follows:
3.1 One which generates multiplicity. 
3.2 One according to Cantor’s set theoretical view: a “many” 
thought of as a one.
3.3 One in the view of mereology: a one made up of many 
parts.
22. Chiara Lubich, Una via nuova: La spiritualità dell ’unità (Rome: Città Nuova, 
2007), p. 39.
23. Chiara Lubich, P, p. 23.
3.1 The most obvious interpretation of one is the numerical in-
terpretation, the “atomic” sense mentioned above. If we take as 
our point of departure the axioms of Peano’s system,24 where we 
read “one is a number” and “for every number n, n + 1 is a num-
ber,” with appropriate precautions regarding the identity relation, 
we generate the number system commonly used to count distinct 
items. Thus Peano does not define one, but takes it as an axiom 
and point of departure to define the natural numbers. The “one” of 
Peano’s axiomatic system does not correspond to the “One” which 
results from the Pact, but rather to the “one which is the principle 
of number” to which Aquinas referred, generalized in this case to 
exclude any reference to material things. 
3.2 As it is well known, Georg Cantor gave an important contri-
bution to the foundations of mathematics with his set theory, in 
which he defines a “set” (Menge) as: “any multitude that can be 
thought of as a one.” In a pertinent note, Cantor makes explicit 
mention of Plato, although it is not clear how he wants to relate 
this to the set as defined by him: 
By multiplicity or set in general I mean every Many that 
can be thought of as a One, or any class composed of de-
terminate elements that can be united in a whole by a law. I 
believe this defines something close to the eidos or idea of 
Plato, or what this same author in Philebus on the Supreme 
Good calls mikton.25 
24. Giuseppe Peano, Italian mathematician and logician gave the axiomatic definition 
of the natural numbers which bears his name and which is considered fundamental 
still today.
25. Georg Cantor, La formazione della teoria degli insiemi: Scritti 1872–1899 (Florence: 
Sansoni Editore, 1992), p. 127.
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The sets of Cantor are therefore by definition classes “composed” 
of determinate elements which can be thought of as atoms, dis-
tinct from one another. The elements “precede” (logically) the set 
and can constitute a “one” “by definition” (a mechanical or men-
tal grouping) or “by substance” (extension of a single predicate). 
The second interpretation taken sine glossa, which is perhaps that 
which Cantor alludes to in his mention of Plato, led ultimately to 
the famed paradox of Russell thus revealing an inherent weakness 
in Cantor’s system, which is known today as naïve set theory.26 
Coming back to our central theme, the theory of sets proposed 
by Cantor as a foundation of mathematics seems apt for describ-
ing the structure or pattern of the situation before the Pact, where 
“Chiara-Jesus, Grazia-Jesus, Giosi-Jesus, etc.” were, as it were, “a 
multiplicity of distinct rays,” “varying for each individual and yet 
one, as the substance of the sun is one.” Cantor’s proposal, how-
ever, appears inadequate if we wish to express “Oneness” as it is de-
scribed after the Pact. In fact, “many thought of as one” represents 
a gnoseological/static “one” rather than an ontological/dynamic 
“one,” as paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 would seem to demand. 
Before going on to the final point, I would like to indicate an-
other interesting definition of one as a number which derives from 
Cantor’s set theory. This definition is attributed to the mathema-
tician John von Neumann. It starts from the empty set Ø (that 
is, the set which contains no member) and goes on to define all 
the numbers. The number “one” is defined as the set which con-
tains the empty set as its sole member: { Ø }. Some authors would 
see this definition as alluding to the fact that everything can be 
26. As is well known, to avoid the paradox, Cantor’s set theory had to be adjusted. It 
was transformed into the axiomatic and less appealing system of Zermelo-Fraenkel. 
reduced to nothing. But the empty set is not “nothing”! We can 
note the difference between this definition of one, which has the 
static interpretation of the empty set as its point of departure, and 
the dynamic nothing described in the metaphor of Jesus forsaken, 
considered as the divine Atom, a One which splits to reveal a 
wealth of relations within. 
3.3 Parallel to Cantor’s theory of sets and in an attempt to overcome 
the difficulties that had emerged with Russell’s paradox, the Polish 
logician Stanislaw Lesniewski developed another theory of classes, 
described by him as a theory of “collective classes,” as opposed to 
the “distributive classes” of Cantor’s set theory.27 Lesniewski, like 
Cantor, thought his proposal could one day become the founda-
tion for all mathematics, but he never saw this fulfilled. 
From Lesniewski’s point of view, a set or class is not considered 
to be “something,” a new or diverse entity, other than the ingre-
dients which make it up. Herein lies the difference with Cantor’s 
set theory. For Lesniewski, the reality of a set or class is noth-
ing other than the reality of its components or constituent parts.28 
27. In a collective sense, a “set” or class is a whole composed of parts. One begins by 
looking at the whole and proceeds to consider the parts. In classical set theory, on 
the other hand, one begins with the elements or with a concept that defines the ele-
ments and only then proceeds to consider these as a whole.  For an introduction to 
the theory of collective classes (Mereology), see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/. An excellent, thorough exposition can 
be found in Peter Simons, Parts. A Study in Ontology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). 
28. This is in the line of Husserl, who was the first to provide an in-depth analysis of 
the relation part/whole (1901). Although Husserl came from a mathematical back-
ground and in an earlier work (Philosophy of Mathematics, 1891), had given an account 
of the one and the many similar to Cantor, in later studies he turned to a logical 
approach and treated the question of the whole and its parts. In his words: “in our 
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This brings our discussion regarding “one” from a conceptual level 
(many thought of as one) to an existential level. In the light of this 
realism, the concept of “empty set” is meaningless for Lesniewski. 
For mereology—the system devised by the Polish scholar—the 
“elements” or “ingredients”29 are the “parts” of a whole, of a truly 
existing object. From this perspective, the whole (the one) and its 
parts are logically co-essential. There can be no parts without a 
whole. But also the whole, as it is defined by Lesniewski, requires 
at least one part (itself ). To distinguish this from the other parts 
that are not the whole, the latter are called “proper parts.”
In reality, the underlying structure of mereology is holistic: 
the same axiom that defines the parts presupposes the whole. Le-
sniewski goes on to provide for the possibility of the “union” of 
various parts through an operation termed “mereological sum” or 
“fusion.” As we shall see, however, the interpretation of mereo-
logical fusion does not correspond to “the being fused into one” 
which we considered above in 2.4. As we have indicated above, 
Lesniewski called his system mereology (from meros = part). Due 
to various difficulties, including the restrictions imposed by the 
Communist regime in Poland during Lesniewski’s lifetime, mere-
ology has become an object of more extensive study only in the 
past few decades. Gradually it became clear that the original ver-
sion proposed by Lesniewski (“classical extensional mereology”) 
is but a bough of a tree with other branches, all useful for de-
scribing with precision the various typologies of the relation part/
definitions and descriptions relative to this point, the concept of whole was a presup-
position. Nonetheless, one can always do without this concept, by substituting it with 
the simple subsisting together of entities previously indicated as parts” (Logical Inves-
tigations, III, 21). 
29. Lesniewski used both terms as equivalent, but since the “element” of mereology 
has a different meaning than the “element” in set theory, the second term “ingredient” 
is preferred to avoid confusion. 
whole. According to the axioms that are added or taken away, the 
resulting mereologies take on various specific characteristics (i.e., 
extensional or non-extensional, atomic or non-atomic). For our 
purposes it will be useful to list three distinct, equally possible, but 
mutually incompatible interpretations which regard the concept 
of one. 
3.3.1 An “Atomistic” (or “Simple”) Interpretation
In this version, all of the ultimate parts are atoms, in the sense of 
not being further divisible into proper parts. This interpretation—
aside from a few philosophical considerations mentioned above, 
for example, regarding the existence or nonexistence of the empty 
set—has little to distinguish it from Cantor’s set theory. In the end 
the parts are discrete entities. The fusion or “mereological sum” is 
equivalent to the union of sets in Cantor. Since it is a sum that 
prescinds from any relation of the members with one another, it 
lacks the quality of wholeness which characterizes the One which 
is the object of our study. The same can be said for fusion in all 
the various interpretations of mereology. The term has a specific, 
limited sense which should not be mistaken for the “being fused 
into One” of the Pact. 
3.3.2 An “Atomless” Interpretation
In this version, no part is an atom. Every part can always be fur-
ther divided. This interpretation is better suited for describing the 
reality of the continuum, because, all told, this is its starting point. 
Based in part on this second alternative, in a non-extensional ver-
sion of mereology,30 L. Obojska has proposed a new definition of 
30. The difference between extensional and non-extensional mereology is also a ques-
tion of axioms. Classical mereology is extensional. In non-extensional mereology it is 
not necessary that there always be a difference between a proper part and the whole. 
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One, in conformity with Aquinas’ intuition that in God the one 
that is convertible with being admits a plurality of relations. It is 
a dynamic identity (DIT) which is constituted of and contains 
within itself an infinity of relations, beginning from the intercon-
nection of three primary relations.31 In other words, in the dynamic 
identity, the relation is not something added on, but rather an in-
trinsic constitutive element. This definition of “one” seems more 
suitable for describing the reality of “One” which results from the 
Pact. It offers an explanation in conformity with the situation that 
each reality can be “in” the other while, at the same time, contain 
the other in itself. In fact the first application of the definition of 
DIT can be found in the field of fractal geometry, a geometrical 
exemplification of “the whole in every part” (see 2.3 above). As to 
“fusion,” the comments made above in 3.3.1 remain true. We can 
also note that in the atomless interpretation of mereology, every 
whole can be expressed “as a fusion” in infinitely different ways, 
in conformity with the characteristics of the One described in 2.2 
and 2.3 above.
3.3.3 An Interpretation Which Admits Both Atomic Entities 
and Atomless Entities
Husserl was actually a predecessor of the classical mereology of 
Lesniewski with his philosophical study of parts. He noted that 
there are some wholes in which the parts “co-penetrate one an-
other,” others in which the parts are “external to one another, but 
which determine real forms of connection, in which every part is 
For example, one can consider the interior of a geometrical disk and the disk itself in 
a mereological class which does not include the circumference.
31. Lidia Obojska, “Primary Relations in a New Foundational Axiomatic Frame-
work,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2007): 641–657. 
linked to every other or they are joined two by two. . . . One and the 
same whole can be, in reference to certain parts, a co-penetration, 
and in reference to other parts an inter-connection.”32 However, as 
Simons has remarked, in mereology the formally possible case of a 
system including both atomic and atomless basic elements has not 
been considered seriously, perhaps owing to the tendency of both 
philosophy and the natural sciences to seek a uniform picture of 
the world.33 
I would suggest that Obojska’s contribution is in consonance 
with this third interpretation and can offer formal categories use-
ful for developing this line of thought in an integrated perspective. 
In fact, beginning from the general category of primary relation 
which Obojska proposes, one can define both the static identity 
(reducible to “atomic” entities) and the dynamic identity (reducible 
to “atomless” entities) and arrive at a formal description of both 
“one” and the “One,” in conformity to the meanings of these terms 
presented above. 
Conclusion 
There has been a perennial return in the history of thought to 
the dialectic of the one and the many, and so the foundations of 
mathematics as developed through time could not but reflect this 
same dilemma. Starting from a formal axiomatic system, like that 
presented in set theory and in the various versions of mereology, 
it is possible to lay down every possible path of rational analysis 
relevant to this theme in a clear and rigorous manner, situating 
32. Husserl, III, 21.
33. See Peter Simons, Parts. A Study in Ontology (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), p. 42. This is a possibility that not even Kant considered as a possible solution of 
the second antimony of reason in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
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the relation one/many within the horizon of the relation whole/
part. In this perspective the One resulting from the Pact of unity 
between Chiara Lubich and Igino Giordani, with all its specific 
characteristic qualities (which is clearly not the simple “number” 
one), turns out to be a concept that has a rational underpinning, 
since the conceptual instruments for its formal description can be 
found in the foundations of mathematics. But we can say even 
more. Not rarely in the history of thought has the interplay be-
tween experience and the communication of what has been expe-
rienced played a role in the progress of understanding. Here too, 
in the case under study, we find that familiarity with the structure 
of the One resulting from the Pact has been a significant factor in 
the development of a promising new axiomatic framework. 
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